Transparency Standards in International Investment Agreement Negotiations: A Chinese Lawyer’s Perspective on the UNCITRAL Rules
(주)코리아스칼라
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- 2023.04.03
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- 2015.03
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서지정보
ㆍ발행기관 : 이준국제법연구원
ㆍ수록지정보 : China and WTO Review / 1권 / 1호
ㆍ저자명 : Qingjiang Kong, Yilin Wang
목차
I. Introduction: Why is Transparency Questioned in Investor-State Arbitrations?
II . Overview of Transparency Standard in International Investment Agreement
A. Global Governance: a Catalyst for Transparency Standards
B. Public Scrutiny: A Substitute for Judicial Review
III . Transparency Standards in Investment Arbitrations: Its Evolutional Interpretation
IV . The Transparency Convention
A. Relationship between Existing IIAs and the Transparency Convention
B. Unilateral Offer to Arbitrate under the Rules on Transparency
C. Applicability of the Transparency Rules to Arbitrations under those other than UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules
D. Applicability of the Transparency Standards in Case of MFN Clause
E. The Formulation of Reservations
V. The UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency:Contrast with Relevant Rules in IIAs and Other Arbitral Rules
A. The UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency at a Glance
B. Comparison among the Rules on Transparency, Other Arbitral Rules and Rules in IIAs
C. A Comment on the Rules on Transparency and Transparency Convention
VI . Conclusion: The Implications of the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency and the Transparency Convention for China
A. To Launch a Transparency-oriented Reform
B. Tune Transparency Standards to China’s Strategy in IIAs Negotiations?
References
영어 초록
The 47th Session of the UNCITRAL finalized the draft Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration. It aims to provide a mechanism to allow the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency to be applied to investment dispute arbitrations mandated by investment treaties concluded before April 1, 2014. This paper intends to examine these UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency and the draft Convention on Transparency. It is particularly in contrast with the relevant rules in the NAFTA, the U.S. Model BIT 2012 and the ICSID Rules 2006, to see if transparency can be enhanced in treaty-based investor-State arbitrations and to extrapolate the implications of the Rules on Transparency and the draft Convention for China’s strategy in BIT or FTA negotiations amid the trendy advancement of transparency standards.
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